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The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering, by william 
Hasker. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2008. Pp. 225. $20 (paper)
Problems of Evil and the Power of God, by James A. keller. burlington: Ash-
gate Publishing, 2007. 176 pp. $100 (Cloth)
brUCe r. reICHeNbACH, Augsburg College
One might slightly revise an ancient saying: of the writing of books on the 
problem of evil there is no end. The two books under review exemplify 
this contention, each well done, each adopting a different critical stance: 
one defending a mostly traditional theistic theodicy, the other critiquing 
such and replacing it with a Process Theology view.
writing in his typically lucid style, william Hasker develops his view 
of the reasons God may have for permitting pain and suffering (evil). He 
sets his agenda by reiterating traditional distinctions between defenses 
and theodicies (he is writing a theodicy), the philosophical and existential 
problems of evil (he is addressing the philosophical problem), and classi-
cal and open theism (he is an open theist, according to which God is tem-
poral, unchanging in God’s nature and character but in dynamic relation 
with the world, profoundly affected by events, and omniscient in a way 
that is consistent with God’s ignorance of the future free acts of agents).
Hasker develops what may be termed a standard free will defense/
theodicy. In chapter 3 he endorses Plantinga’s free will defense against 
the deductive argument from evil, with the caveat of avoiding the middle 
knowledge component of Plantinga’s argument. In chapter 4 he responds 
to the objection that God did not create the best of all possible worlds 
by reiterating Adams’s (and others’) contention that the requirement that 
God create the best of all possible worlds entails the logically impossible, 
since for any world God chose to create, there could be a greater one. 
rowe’s contention that for any world God created God had to create a 
better one in order to protect his moral goodness is plainly inconsistent 
with the notion of what is logically possible. Hasker also endorses Mor-
ris’s contention that the goods of alternative possible worlds are incom-
mensurable. From his open theism, he stresses that God’s choice was for 
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a “broad world type” rather than for prearranged or specific scenarios, so 
that what devolves is a surprise (and risk) to us and to God. 
In chapter 5 Hasker develops a theodicy for natural evil. He brings to-
gether the contention that it is good that there is a world, complex and 
evolving, with the view that it provides creaturely autonomy for sentient 
beings. This scenario means that natural evil will be not only possible but 
inevitable. One objection to this scenario is that we can imagine a natural 
world with different laws that will result in less evil. Hasker rejects this; 
we might think that we can imagine such, but whether this conception is 
coherent and the conceived natural world would actually result in less 
evil is far beyond our ken. Indeed, the information on the fine tuning our 
universe required for sentient life suggests that other world systems with 
natural constants that have sentient creatures are quite unlikely. but, one 
might ask, what about Heaven? Here Hasker resorts to the skeptical re-
sponse that we really don’t know enough about what Heaven might be 
like to use this as an objection or to construct a response to it. we are left 
merely to “idle speculation.”
In chapter 6 Hasker develops the free will theodicy for moral evil. 
Though some evils may be accounted for in terms of soul-making or 
punishment for sin, the primary emphasis falls on the conjunction of five 
theses: the world contains persons who are intelligent and free, such a 
world offers the potential for good, alterative worlds without these fea-
tures would not offer a comparable potential, constant divine interven-
tion would undermine the structure needed for significant human moral 
actions, and it is good that God created such a world that made human 
society possible.
For critics perhaps the most disputable section of the book is Hask-
er’s treatment of what he terms rowe’s requirement: that a moral being 
would prevent the occurrence of serious evil unless that action would 
lose a greater good or create some equal or greater evil. Hasker argues 
that the Requirement conflicts with another principle, namely, that God 
desires that humans fulfill moral obligations, especially by assuming a 
major responsibility for the welfare of others (he restricts it to human be-
ings, but as Keller points out, to respond to Rowe’s example of the suffer-
ing fawn, Hasker would have to extend it more broadly to nonhumans). 
If God as good is obligated and expected to prevent all gratuitous evil, 
we would have no incentive to engage in moral activity on behalf of oth-
ers. To rowe’s response that though the class of gratuitous evils cannot 
be eliminated, God could eliminate individual evils that are unnecessary 
(which in turn means that there are no gratuitous evils; all evils would 
serve some greater good), Hasker replies that this position undermines 
the requirement for moral action, since the person contemplating an im-
moral action would know that God would bring good out of it anyway 
or would not permit it to happen. The point here is that evils that are 
not particularly required for the greater good of moral action but whose 
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possibility is necessary for this greater good are justified, and this is suf-
ficient to mitigate Rowe’s objection.
Unfortunately, Hasker does not say anything at this point about mir-
acles. Since his discussion is couched in biblical thought, and since mir-
acles form a central piece for understanding Jesus’ ministry, one might 
expect a discussion of the miracles God, through Jesus, used to eliminate 
evils. If many evils, especially natural evils, are gratuitous, is there any 
reason why at least more of them are not miraculously eliminated, al-
beit leaving some for our moral improvement? That is, could not God 
eliminate or mitigate those about which we really cannot do anything 
anyway but which are particularly horrible? Hasker does contend that no 
general principle can be formulated to cover the relevant moral require-
ments that moral beings act with regard to such evils, for such principles 
would lead either to the requirement of eliminating all or all gratuitous 
evils. Yet one might wonder whether, since the miracles of Jesus appear 
without moral disenfranchisement worries, God at least could do more to 
remove the graver gratuitous evils without infringing on Hasker’s moral 
requirement principle. It is here, as we shall see, that keller wishes to 
drive home his critique.
In the final chapter Hasker turns to the triumph of God over evil. He 
explores various options and rejects those that harken to rowe’s require-
ment that there be triumph over all evil. He suggests that the triumph 
will be in a “world of fulfilled human lives, free from suffering, death 
and evil, permeated with the knowledge and love of God” (p. 224). The 
suffering people have experienced will be “engulfed in the experience of 
intimacy with God,” where God expresses his forgiveness of us. evil will 
no longer be able to oppose the good. but this brings atheologians back to 
their question: if this can be done in the future, why could it not have been 
accomplished in the past? why does the triumph of God over evil take so 
long, especially when, according to Christian theology, it was to have been 
finished on the cross? Indeed, instead of things getting better, things seem 
to be getting worse: the examples of horrendous evils Hasker appeals to 
are of recent occurrence. So though he refused earlier to say much about 
the “heaven objection,” his treatment of triumph in the final chapter rein-
vigorates that very objection.
James keller’s views on the problem of evil are almost the contrary of 
Hasker’s. whereas Hasker constructs what he takes to be a successful theo-
dicy, in his closely reasoned dialectical work keller undertakes a critique 
not only of the free-will/soul making theodicy, but of a more broadly con-
ceived problem of evil. After keller undertakes to show that the evidential 
problem of evil persists, he expands his conception of evil to include the 
“evils” of divine hiddenness, injustice of miracles, and any particularistic 
account of revelation viewed as communicative. keller painstakingly sets 
forth to show that classic Christian theism fails, largely because it neither 
provides reason for its views nor resolves what he considers to be out-
standing difficulties.
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In chapter 2 keller concentrates on the soul-building and free-will 
theodicies, focusing particularly on Hasker’s arguments presented else-
where. keller develops three objections. First, a God who stands by and 
allows the evils present in the world must be accounted a guilty by-stand-
er. Hasker’s reply is that preventing all gratuitous evils would remove 
human motivation for moral action. but, keller argues, a revealing God 
could inform us about God’s policy of evil-prevention and thus provide 
motivation for human moral action. “They might realize that God is per-
mitting some potentially gratuitously evil situation to develop in order 
to give them the chance to make a correct moral decision to prevent the 
occurrence. They might know that if they did not do the morally correct 
thing, God would prevent the evil, but they still would have failed to do 
their moral duty” (p. 13). 
Second, the soul building theodicy treats the victim as a means to some-
one else’s good. He rejects Eleonore Stump’s contention that all suffering 
is potentially beneficial to the person who suffers, for at times too much 
suffering, let alone death, occurs. He sees that the only way out is for the 
theist to claim that God has a general policy of not preventing any evils, 
which would rule out the theist’s belief in miracles. After considering 
whether God could make changes in the laws of nature, keller worries 
about animal suffering, since in this case there is no moral development 
in sight. Chapter 2 provides a formidable contrast to Hasker. The nub of 
the issue concerns the extent to which God, without removing significant 
moral agency, can intervene in the world to prevent the worst evils. keller 
argues that ultimately the theist has to hold that God must adopt a hands-
off policy in order to reconcile evil with God’s goodness, which conflicts 
with the conception of an engaging God espoused by Hasker’s theism.
In chapter 3 keller takes up the problem of divine hiddenness as a form 
of the problem of evil. Although God’s nature might be obscure, there is 
no reason why God’s will must be so. keller thinks that, even granting the 
noetic effects of sin, God could “overcome the blindness caused by human 
defectiveness, either by repairing the defect or by making things about 
God even more obvious, or both” (p. 35). And if the divine hiddenness is 
treated as a punishment for sin, it certainly is not effective in any utilitar-
ian way to restore humans or encourage them to leave their sinfulness; 
revelational clarity would suffice much better. Since we lack voluntary 
control over our beliefs, divine hiddenness works to decrease rather than 
increase belief.
In chapter 4 keller takes up miracles, which played such an important 
role in chapter 2, and which I suggested above constitutes a weak element 
in Hasker’s careful treatment. The essence of his argument concerns God’s 
justice: should God fail to distribute miracles equally or at least according 
to need, God is unjust. The fact that God does not owe us anything does 
not contravene the fact that since God has unlimited resources and we 
have great need, God could meet those needs and failure to do so hardly 
comports with a benevolent God. keller distinguishes between epistemic 
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and practical miracles. regarding the former, which are meant to bring us 
to God, keller argues that a just God has to make equally clear the grounds 
for believing the original miracles so that persons living later could be-
lieve. Otherwise, those who come later are in no position to assess the au-
thenticity of the miracle accounts. with regard to practical miracles, keller 
contends that there are no cases of unambiguous miracles of healing. The 
data simply are unclear. In effect, Keller’s contention is that there are no 
grounds for believing in miracles, for God should have made known to 
us more clearly that the alleged miracles really occurred. As might be ex-
pected, this provides the grounds for his subsequent skeptical treatment 
of revelation in chapter 6. Without attesting miracles, we have no reason 
to think that scriptural writers (in any religion) convey God’s word. The 
bible contains errors, unclear doctrines, unclear ecclesiology, inaccurate 
phenomenal accounts, and fails to distinguish clearly when various types 
of language are being employed. Swinburne’s appeal to church authority 
fails to rescue the case for revelation: why should we think that the au-
thority rests in the Church—and which Church? keller’s main thesis is re-
peated in response to both Swinburne and Plantinga: “If God has wished 
to make known such propositions, it is surely plausible to think that God 
would have identified and certified them clearly” (p. 104).
keller contends that “the only truly good grounds for regarding some 
propositions as divinely revealed would be obvious miracles supporting 
their having that status” (p. 109). but authenticating belief is precisely 
what some New Testament writers claim. For example, the author of 
John’s gospel contends that this was precisely the point of the miracles 
he records. Hence, given keller’s conditions, he cannot conclude that 
“there is no good reason to suppose that the biblical writers themselves 
were the recipients of supernaturally communicated revealed truths of 
significance to humans in general” (p. 109). He responds that nonethe-
less miracles do theists no good in their quest for revelation, because 
they did not witness the miracle. but that keller does not have any evi-
dence does not entail that there is or was no evidence. keller’s response 
is a restatement of his general argument, namely, that God should be 
clearer at least to him and to many others, and that this is a version of 
the problem of evil. 
As an alternative keller opts for a manifestation account of revelation: 
God is “manifested in various events, and in some events God’s character 
is more clearly revealed than it is in other events” (p. 110). but this is as 
much, if not more, problematic than the communication account of revela-
tion. what events manifest God’s character? As Hume suggested, unless 
we already know something about God’s character, the finitude and evil 
in the world might “manifest” a different character than, for example, tra-
ditional or Process Theism suggests. keller suggests that discriminating 
manifestational events really does not matter, since different revelations 
would manifest different things. Christians can accept their Bible because 
they “experience (what they take to be) salvation in a tradition for which 
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the Bible is the original written source” (p. 110). However, this does not 
mean that there is any such thing as salvation, that God wants them to be 
saved, or that they need to be. They just need to think that they are satis-
fied with this account, and God can “cause them to feel confidence about 
the beliefs.” Of course, this feeling of confidence is as, if not more, sub-
ject to delusion than the communication account, since in this revelation 
nothing has been communicated—“there are no propositions for which 
we have clear, divine certification that they are revealed” (p. 111)—and 
there are no ways to distinguish God-caused confidence from delusional 
confidence. We are left to “work out” our own religious beliefs.
Following on his extensive criticism of the major aspects of traditional 
theism—largely on the ground that given the traditional theists’ concep-
tion of God, God could be expected to do more: remove or prevent evils, 
make God and God’s will for humans invariably plain, certify miracles so 
that there is no doubt that they convey the message God wants or are re-
ally suspensions of natural law, or make God’s revelations unambiguous 
and certified—Keller in the final chapter lays out his own Process theolog-
ical position to resolve the problems his book raises. According to keller, 
God’s omnipotence must be radically reconceived to function only to pro-
vide “a graded range of possibilities for what the new occasion can be-
come” (p. 136). New actual occasions do not consciously decide between 
these possibilities, but given the causal conditions and possibilities they 
become one thing rather than another, and as such are partly self-deter-
mining, though at the same time greatly limited by their past. God’s role 
is “to sustain the overall orderliness of nature and also provide a source 
of novelty within this overall order” (p. 137). God does this without uni-
lateral, efficient-cause intervention. Rather, God lures actual occasions to 
novelty and change within their possibilities. Not only do actual occasions 
have some or limited freedom of self-determination, but conscious beings 
have significant freedom because of “occasions in the brain that comprise 
the mind.” 
keller uses this to construct his responses to views where he deems that 
the traditional theist has failed. with regard to the traditional problem of 
evil, keller notes that actual entities experience evil because God evokes 
natural processes that proceed because of their pasts. Since God cannot 
bring about unilateral change, he is unable to affect the process besides 
providing periodic luring impulses to do the good. As such, God is not a 
guilty bystander nor does God make others victims. but, one might ask, 
why isn’t God more effective in luring actual entities to do the good? Keller 
responds that “God is always doing all God can to make the universe as 
good as it can be” (p. 142). but, the theist might respond, what evidence 
is there that God is doing God’s best? It might seem not very evident, 
given keller’s earlier objections that appeal to the prevalence of horren-
dous evils, that this is the case. Indeed, Keller’s affirmation that things are 
on the whole more good than bad strikes a very different pose from that 
afforded earlier (p. 15). Though Keller notes that only God is in a position 
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to know that God is doing God’s best, it would seem that God could by 
some manifestation let us know this.
keller’s response is that God cannot communicate to us directly, for 
God’s influence on individuals is preconscious. But why must it be pre-
conscious? why cannot the lure be conscious? After all, God has “wishes” 
that individuals move in a certain direction. Indeed, keller goes on to sug-
gest that God can be involved in “certain events in a special way . . . that 
involve an especially clear manifestation of God and God’s will” (p. 145). 
but if propositional revelation is unclear, it would seem that manifesta-
tional revelation would be equally if not more unclear, for how would one 
know that an event conforms to God’s will for an individual? How would 
actual occasions know that God has lured them to some thought or feel-
ing they would not have otherwise had, for they do not know what the 
“otherwise” is?
As Keller holds the feet of the theist to the fire, so the theist might re-
turn the favor. For one thing, keller frequently complains that theists have 
no evidence for their claims about how and when God intervenes in hu-
man affairs, for example, in revelation and miracles. But the theist might 
respond that keller has no evidence that God’s role is to sustain orderli-
ness and provide a source of novelty. why cannot orderliness be merely 
a result of efficient causation (viewed according to so-called natural laws) 
and novelty be the product of random mutation causing variation at times 
sustained by the environment? As keller notes, non-theists can ignore 
Process accounts of miracles and will miss nothing (p. 146).
Second, if actual occasions can be efficient causes and unilaterally ef-
fect changes, why cannot God be such a cause? keller allows the actual 
occasions that compose billiard balls to unilaterally cause other balls to 
move (p. 139). but if this is consistent with the freedom or power inher-
ent in all actual occasions, why would the comparable divine action be 
incompatible? Why must divine causal order differ from that exercised by 
other causes? Whitehead himself countenances the consistency of efficient 
causation and self-creative determination (Process and Reality [1929], p. 75). 
If God has desires and purposes, one would think that possessing efficient 
causation, as other actual entities apparently do, would be a better way of 
responding at least to natural evil.
Perhaps most problematic is keller’s contention that what God and 
God’s will are like “are human reconstructions” (p. 144). but if so, then we 
have little to go on to authenticate Keller’s account of God and God’s wish-
es or activity. That is, we have little reason to think that this is the way God 
is, if God exists at all. To say that “this is what one would expect if God . . 
. ” turns out to be quite post hoc: we create a god to fit our expectations.
Much more can be said about these rich treatments of the problems of 
evil. both deserve careful reading and critical interaction, including where 
they function point-counterpoint. And, as one would expect, others will 
take up the cudgel, for in the writing of books on the problem of evil there 
is no end.
